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Abstract. Do individuals in John Rawls’s original position take into account the fallibility of              
human nature? Some notable commentators on Rawls say that they do or that they should.               
But this enables us to say that individuals in the original position would not come to an                 
agreement at all. 
 
Different people have different views about what the rules of society should be, at              
least in the country where I live. Some people think that the rules should preserve tradition;                
other people think that the rules should give people as much liberty as possible; yet other                
people have other views. John Rawls thinks the rules should be fair (1971: 3-4). But when are                 
the rules fair? 
Rawls has devised a method for evaluating sets of rules, in order to determine when               
one set is fairer than another. The underlying idea behind Rawls’s method is that one set of                 
rules would be fairer if self-interested individuals would prefer that set, so long as each               
individual does not rely on information about their own specific situation (1971: 136). To              
illustrate this possibility: a person with a university degree may, if given the opportunity, try               
to ensure that the rules of society favour people with this qualification, e.g. by recommending               
the rule that only people who have this qualification are allowed to be members of               
government. If self-interested individuals come to an agreement about the societal rules            
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without any individual relying on information about their own specific case, the result would              
be a fair agreement, Rawls thinks. 
On the basis of this idea, Rawls asks us to imagine some self-interested individuals              
coming together and forming an agreement on the rules of society, but each individual lacks               
information about their own specific case. Amongst other things, they do not know their              
occupation, gender, class position, natural endowments, or conception of what a good life             
would be (1971: 137).  
Rawls calls the conditions these individuals are in “the original position.” In these             
conditions, there are some things they do know. They know that they are human beings and                
they know facts about human nature (1971: 137). They also know that some agreements are               
harder to keep than others. They are not to make an agreement that, given appropriate               
circumstances, they would not keep. A further thing that they know is that the agreement they                
make will be final. Finality is a special condition that Rawls incorporates into the original               
position. He writes: 
They cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they cannot           
accept. They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great difficulty.              
Since the original agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second              
chance. (1971: 176) 
However, what Rawls says here leads to a contradiction. Rawls thinks that it is possible for                
individuals in the conditions he proposes to come to an agreement. But they know facts about                
human nature. One fact about human nature is that human beings are fallible. There is a                
chance of making mistakes. In which case, individuals in the original position may be making               
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a mistake when agreeing on certain rules. In which case, given that any agreement they enter                
into is final, a consequence of any agreement is that they may have to live under a mistaken                  
agreement, with no opportunity to revise it. Or at least they must be open to this possibility.                 
In which case, because they will not enter into agreements with consequences that they              
cannot accept, they will not enter into any agreement. 
The question of whether individuals in the original position take into account the             
fallibility of human nature has been addressed before. To my knowledge, Allen Buchanan             
was the first to explicitly address the question. He proposes that that they will take fallibility                
into account. He thinks that this proposal blocks certain objections to Rawls (1975: 182-183).              
He does not notice the argument above. Joseph Raz says that if they do not take human                 
fallibility into account, then the original position will justify a constitution with no room for               
revision if a mistake is uncovered (1986: 126). He implies that they should take it into                1
account. If humans are indeed fallible, Rawls implies this as well (1971: 137-138). But then               
they will not form any agreement at all. 
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about fallibility and eventually arrived at the argument made in this paper. 
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